The Turkish Factor in Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the Context of Eurasian Integration

Today, the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) have to respond to a set of challenges and threats that hinder the progressive development of regional integration. Among them are the problems of relations between the member countries themselves, who found themselves in a difficult situation in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. This does not detract from the huge potential of Eurasian integration and the possibility of expanding the range of interested participants in this project. For this reason, Russia and Kazakhstan are obliged to fully protect the constructive, allied, fraternal relations that have developed between them, especially since the success of Eurasian integration as a whole largely depends on this. The combination of objective factors and circumstances, including the spread of Turkey’s influence in Central Asia, puts RussianKazakh relations to certain tests. The Great Turan project, implemented by Turkey and its Turkicspeaking partners, carries certain risks for Russia. The purpose of this study is to clarify the circumstances related to this. At the same time, the author focuses on the development of Russian-Kazakh economic relations in the context of the implementation of the Eurasian integration project. It exposes the myth that the EEU is a politicized institution inspired by the “imperial elites” of Russia. Revealing and analyzing the existing conflict of interests, certain differences in the understanding of the tactical tasks of national development, the author shows that the conflict potential in relations between Russia and Kazakhstan is reliably stopped both by the leaders of the states and by the high level of good-neighborliness and popular will and has no prospects of aggravation. At the same time, the conclusion is justified that no problematic issues of Russian-Kazakh relations can devalue the positive prospects for Eurasian integration. The author also seeks to substantiate the thesis about the inability of the Turkish factor to cause damage to Russian-Kazakh relations and the Eurasian project as a whole. Moreover, the author tries to bring an objective platform under the statement about the compatibility and the possibility of interfacing the Eurasian and all-Turkic integration projects.

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