Game Modeling of the Political Space: Analysis of Foreign Literature

Purpose is to identify the main trends and gaps in the research of foreign scientists on the topic “Game modeling of political space”.

Methods. In this review, the authors used a semi-systematic method of researching the literature, in which at the first stage they used quantitative methods, and then the selected array of publications was investigated by the integrative method, revealing theoretical studies and practical results of the application of game political components.

Results. Based on the selected foreign publication stream on the topic “game modeling of political space” by the method of semi-systematic analysis, six main trends in the study and application of game theory and game modeling in political discourse have been identified:

• considering the value of game modeling through the prism of interaction, not collision of actors;
• application of game modeling in the development and adoption of political decisions;
• development of new approaches to the analysis of the very methodology of game modeling in politics;
• game as a form of effective political communication;
• study of game theory on the basis of fundamental classical monographs of the mid-20th century as applied to the solution of pressing political problems;
• application of game modeling in predicting election results, especially in those political systems that are based on the theory of rational choice during voting.

A lacuna in the studies of recent decades has identified the issue of using political game modeling in electoral processes. Despite the continuing relevance of the topic of elections around the world, no significant volume of publications was selected.

Conclusions. Foreign researchers use the potential of game modeling in politics more often and more multifaceted than in domestic political science. Evolutionary game-theoretic models are used not only to model political and international processes themselves, but also to related social spheres, such as economics, religious and ethnic relations. Game theory is used to study a wide range of social and political problems and social phenomena: voting, fundamentalism, religious and ethnic conflicts, civil violence.

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